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THE CUTLER LECTURES
Established at the College of William and Mary
in l7irginia by James Goold Cutler
of Rochester, N. Y.
The late James Goold Cutler of Rochester, New
York, in making his generous gift to the endowment
of the Marshall-Wythe School of Government and
Citizenship in the College of William and Mary
provided, among other things, that one lecture
should be given at the . College in each calendar year
by some person "who is an outstanding authority on
the Constitution of the United States." Mr. Cutler
wisely said that it appeared to him that the most
useful contribution he could make to promote the
making of democracy safe for the world (to invert
President Wilson's aphorism) was to promote serious. consideration by as many people as possible of
certain points fundamental and therefore vital to
the permanency of constitutional government in the
United States. Mr. Cutler declared as a basic proposition that our political system breaks down, when
and where it fails, because of the lack of sound education of the people for whom and by whom it was
intended to be carried on.
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently successful business men who took time from his busy life
to study constitutional government. As a result of
his study, he recognized with unusual clearness the
magnitude of our debt to the makers, interpreters
and defenders of the Constitution of the United
States.
(!

.,

He was deeply interested in the College of William and Mary because he was ai student of history
and knew what great contributions were made to
the cause of constitutional government by men who
taught and studied here-Wythe and Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, Monroe and Tyler, and a host
of others who made this country great. He, therefore, thought it peculiarly fitting to endow a chair
of government here and to provide for a popular
"lecture each year by some outstanding authority
on the Constitution of the United States."
The first lecturer in the course was Honorable
James M. Beck, former Solicitor General of the
United States, and now a member of Congress from
the City of Philadelphia. Perhaps no man in recent
years has written and spoken more effectively on the
Constitution of the United States. His books, entitled "The Constitution of the United States," 1922,
and "The Vanishing Rights of the States," 1926,
have attracted widespread attention.

JNO.

GARLAND POLLARD,

Dean of the Marshall-Wythe School of
Government and Citiz.enship of the
College of William and Mary.

OUR CHANGING
CONSTITUTION*
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:
It is ~ great, but undeserved, honor to inaugurate
this series of lectures under a Foundation · which
this venerable college ow:es to the enlightened patriotism of the late James Goold Cutler. The
founder made a happy selection, for where could a
series of lectures upon the Constitution of the
United States be held with more propriety than ill!
the historic town, where, under the auspices of that
great old preceptor, Chancellor Wythe, Thomas
Jefferson and John Marshall laid the foundations of
their unequalled careers as jurists and statesmen?
Contemporary novelists have held up to ridicule
the small town, and "Main Street" has passed into
a by-word, but, if it were not irrelevant to my
theme, it would be a satisfaction to defend the
small town against the great city, as the nursery of
great men. Athens, Bethlehem, Stratford, Philadelphia and Williamsburg-all little towns in their
golden period-gave to the world more than their
share of the few supremely great immortals.
In inaugurating this series of lectures, which,
*An Address delivered at the College of William and Mary
under the Auspices of the James Goold Cutler Foundation" on
November 18, 1927, by James M. Beck, formerly Solicitor General of the United States.

under the terms of the Foundation, must relate to
the Constitution of the United States and which we
may hope will continue as long as the Constitution
itself endures, it seemed to me appropriate that the
first lecture should deal with the nature of the Constitution as a living instrument of government, and
this suggests the narrower question as to whether
the Constitution is like the North Star, "of whose
true-fix'd and resting quality, there is no fellow in
the firmament," or whether the Constitution is everchanging to meet the necessities of a changing time
:lnd a changing people.
The popular conception, undoubtedly, is that excepting only as it is formally amended, the (Constitution is a fixed quantity, a static force, the same
yesterday, today and, presumably, forever ') To it
has been imputed the immutability of the Ten Commandments, as though its letters, like the Decalogue,
were graven in imperishable stone. It has been
likened to Gihraltar, against which the winds and
waves have beaten for centuries in vain, and John
Marshall found in it the realization of that "government of laws and not of men," which was first written into the Massachus ~tts Constitution of 1780 as
the great objective of free government. The fact is
that a "government of laws and not of men," in the
literal sense, finds little justification in the hard realities of life, and it may be questioned whether such
a theory of government would be even desirable.
An organism, which develops by evolutionary
growth, is better than an unchanging stone.
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There is some force in Jefferson's belief that the
Constitution w:as made "for the living and not for
the dead." Had the Constitution been a rigid document and insusceptible of change, except through the
formal processes of amendlment, it would have died
still-born. 'Vhen the Constitution was put into
force, that wise and genial philosopher, Franklin,
said:
"Our Constitution is in actual operation; everything appears to promise it will last, but in this
world nothing is certain but death and taxes."
Consciously or unconsciously, he was a dis.ciple of
Jeremy Bentham and believed that governments
and forms of governments are but means to an end
and that their justification is in their practical
utility. The greatest of Teachers once said that the
Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the
Sabbath.
The two greatest personalities of the Convention
likewise regarded the forms of government as less
important than the force behind them. Writing on
February 7, 1788, to his friend and comrade in
arms, the Marquis de Lafayette, Washington said
that the new government would be in no danger of
degenerating into a monarchy, obligarchy or aristocracy, or any other form of despotism, "so long as
there shall remain any virtue in the body of the
people." . He then continued:
"I would not be understood, my dear Marquis,
to speak of consequences which may be produced in

the revolution of ages by corruption of morals,
profligacy of manners, or listlessness in the preservation of the natural and unalienable rights. of mankind, nor of the successful usurpations, that may be
established at such an unpropitious juncture upon
the ruins of liberty, however providently guarded
and secured; as these are contingencies against which
no human prudence can effectually provide."
When Franklin, on the last day of the Convention, implored--some say with tears in his eyesthe reluctant delegates to sign the great compact, he
thus gave utterance to the same truth:
"There is no form of government but what may
be a blessing to the people if well administered for a
course of years, and can only end in despotism, as
other forms have done before it, when the people
shall become so corrupted as to need despotic government, being incapable of any other."
The truth was never more effectively expressed
than by the founder of Pennsylvania, who said:
"Governments, like clocks, go from the motion
men give them and, as governments are made and
moved by men, so by men they are ruined, too.
Therefore, governments rather depend upon men
than men upon governments."
Similarly, the great English statesman, Canning,
once spoke of the "idle supposition that it is the
harness and not the horses that draw the chariot
along."
In considering the Constitution we should avoid
that pietistic attitude that regards it as having a
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sanction other than that of reason and utility and
which accepts it as a divinely inspired revelation,
which it were impiety to question in any respect.
Such, surely, was not the attitude of the men who
framed it. As one of their number, Robert Morris,
said:
"This paper has been the subject of infinite investigation, disputation and declamation. While
some have · boasted it as a work from Heaven,
others have given it a less righteous origin. I have
many reasons to believe that it is the work of plain,
honest men, and such, I think, it will appear."
This sacerdotal view of the Constitution largely
reflects the influence of the bar, to whom naturally
the people look for their conceptions of the Constitution. The bar was originally the child of the
Church and has never wholly escaped from the spirit
of sacerdotalism. Lawyers were originally ecclesiastics and at a time when the subtlety of the scholiast
most prevailed. We lawyers are too apt to regard
the doctrines of the law as final truths, having their
sanction in some judicial ipse dixit or political document. Religion, which rests its justification in supernatural revelation, may well believe in final and indisputable truths, but human laws, whether they are
ordinary statutes or fundamental constitutions, have
no such authority. vLaw is only the reasonecJi adjustment of human relations. As these human relations
are forever changing, sometimes with kaleidoscopic
swiftness, it follows that the institutions of the law
can never be static. Even if legal conceptions could

be accepted as final truths yet it is impossible to define them in the imperfect medium of language with
any finality, for the very meaning of words changes
from generation to generation and, thus, in the matter of law, the definition too often survives the rule.
This sacerdotal conception of law has led to much
foolish expression about the sanctity of laws,
whether they be wise or unwise, and we forget the
elemental fact that we cannot ask people to respect
a law that is intrinsically not worthy of respect.
The vague conception of jurists, which we call
"natural law," and sometimes the "higher law,"
means little more than the inherent right of men
to protest against laws which are against "common
right and reason."
The law, I repeat, is but the reasoned adjustment of human relations. It has no inherent sanctity
and its validity, at least in the forum of conscience,
depends upon its reasonableness. Hence, it is a
good sign when men protest against an unreasonable law. "N ew occasions teach new duties; time
makes ancient good uncouth," and the very essence
of the democratic spirit is not merely to adopt new
laws when occasions require them, but to repeal old
laws when experience has demonstrated either their
impracticability or injustice. Let us never forget
the historic basis of the American Commonwealth,
for the people of Virginia, and later the people of
the United Colonies, all revolted against unjust laws,
which had the highest sanction, from a constitutional
standpoint, in the mandate of a legally omnipotent
Parliament.
[ IO ]
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All this is not said to lessen in any respect the
deep regard that every American should have for
the wise provisions of a Constitution, which, after
13 8 years of experience, has been found so beneficial to the American people. On the contrary, my
purpose is rather to indicate that the strength of
the Constitution is in its capacity for progressive
development. The framers were wise in what they
provided, but they were wise to the point of inspiration in what they left unprovided. iN othing
was further from their pretentions than to provide
an immutable rule for all time. They not only made
express provision for formal amendment, but in
their enumeration of objectives, rather than in their
close definition of powers, they made possible the
growth of the Constitution through usage, political
habits, judicial interpretation and, when necessary,
formal amendment. They were not foolish enough
to anticipate the changes of the future, or measure
its demands. All they tried to do was to provide,
first, the machinery of motion, and, secondly, the
chart for the voyage, and what they tried to do,
and did accomplish with unparalleled success, was
to direct the course of the Ship of State as it sailed
onward over the illimitable ocean of time. In other
words, the Constitution was not a dock, to which the
Ship of State was securely fastened, nor w;as it even
an anchor to keep the ship from motion. It was
rather a rudder, which should guide the course, and
a motive, power, which should d!rive the Ship of
State onward. Had it been otherwise, its life would
[ II ]

have been a short one, for the advancement of the
most changing and progressive people in the world
could never have been "cribbed, cabined and confined" within any hard and unyielding formula.
Expressions from the opinion of the Supreme
Court could be cited which both affirm and disaffirm
this idea of a changing Constitution, but the differences between them are more metaphysical than
real. While it has been said by the Supreme Court
that the meaning of the Constitution "does not alter"
and that "what it meant when adopted it means
now," yet this is only 't rue in a qualified sense, for
no one can read the interpretations of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, now reported in two
hundred and seventy-two volumes, without being
confronted by the fact that, in a thousand respects,
meanings have been attributed to the literal provisions of the Constitution, of which its framers could
not possibly have dreamed.
In one of the greatest of his opinions, McCulloch
vs. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall recognized
the inevitable changes, which the adaption of the
Constitution to new conditions necessarily brings
about. He said:
"This provision is made in a constitution intended
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to
be adapted to the various crises of human ,affairs.
To have prescribed the means by wlhich government
should in all future times execute its powers would
have been to change entirely the character of the
instrument and to give it the properties of a legal
code. It would have been an! unwise attempt to
[ 12 ]

provide by immutable 'rules for exigencies, which, if
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly and can
best be provided for as they occur."
The suggestion that the Constitution is as changeless as the laws of the Medes and Persians may be
refuted by the single fact that the democratic genius
of our people refused from the beginning to elect a
President in the cumbrous form prescribed in the
Constitution and, while the letter still remains as a
form and the electoral colleges still survive, the
electors, instead of selecting themselves the Presi;
dent, merely record the choice of their constituents.
This is almost as binding as though it were written
into the Constitution. An elector, theoretically,
could make another choice, but, undler our constitutional system, as developed by usage, it would be,
except under extraordinary circumstances, the betrayal of a public trust.
The proof that ours is 'a changing Constitution
can be attested by a fact, which few intelligent students of our history would deny, that, if the framers
of the Constitution were to revisit the "glimpses of
the moon," and now study their handiwork as it has
been developed since 1787, they would in many respects fail to recognize the product of their labors.
Take, for example, the commerce clause of the Constitution, economically the most potential of all. As
understood by the Fathers: it was only intended to
regulate the ships, which in our coastwise or foreign
trade, transported products from state to state. It
has now developed into an infinitely complex system,

under which the Federal Government regulates
agencies of which the Fathers never dreamed and
regulates them in every detail, however minute.
Indeed, an unchanging Constitution would be an
impossibility, for Plato uttered a great truth more
than two thousand years ago, that a Constitution
must ic orrespond with what he called the "ethos"
of the people, meaning thereby not merely the spirit
of the people, but the aggregate of their habits,
conventions and ideas. These obviously change
from generation to generation. If there be any
( conflict between the Constitution and the spirit of
the people, it is not the will of the people that is
broken, but the Constitution. Therefore, to insure
vitality there must be a reasonable correspondence
between the Constitution, as interpreted, and the
spirit of the people. Of this, undoubtedly, the most
conspicuous example is the profound modification in
the representative principle which was the basis of
the Constitution. The framers believed in all sincerity-and, theoretically, they were right-that the
limit of democracy is the selection of representatives,
who would exercise their own judgment in a judicial
spirit for the common good. Nothing was further
from their purpose than any direct decision by the
people of public policies, but this view did not accord with the democratic genius of the people, as
George Mason of Virginia and Benjamin Franklin
of Pennsylvania clearly pointed out in the Constitutional Convention. At least from I800, when Mr.
Jefferson came into power, until the present time the
[ I4 ]

working theory of our government is that in some
way the representative must first determine the will
of his constituents and then put it into effect, however unwise. We may quarrel with such a theory,
for to it is largely due the deterioration of leadership without which a nation cannot be great, but it is
none the less a fact with which we must reckon.
It must be recognized, moreover, that the Constitution was not the origin of the American Commonwealth and that our nation did not begin with its
adoption. The American Commonwealth began
with the landing of the first English settlers upon
the coasts of Virginia, and this Commonwealth, even
though it lacked organic existence, had its habits,
customs and institutions, which no Oonstitution could
supersede and of which the Constitution was intended to be only a partial express,ion.
These unwritten institutions of the American
people are also a part of our constitutional system,
in the broader sense of the word. They are analogous to the unwritten constitution of England,
which is none the less potent because it is unwritten,
and these institutions, as those of England, are everchanging in character and scope, and the interpretation of the Constitution, whether by usage, habit
or judicial interpretation, slowly changes with them.
All this need not be regretted, for nothing that \
has vitality is at rest. Stagnancy is death and when I
the people of the United States cease to deliberate
upon the meaning of the great Compact and, what
is more, when they cease to adapt it, either by
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popular usage or judicial interpretation, to the everchanging needs of the most progressive people in the
history of the world, then it will cease to be.
Moreover, the Constitution, great and admirable
as it was, could not be unaffected by the profound
changes which have taken place in the world since
it was formulated. These changes, of little more
than a century, have more profoundly changed the
cond~tions of human life than all the changes that
took place in the world from the beginning of the
Christian era. The Convention was held at a time
when the world was passing from a pastoral, agricultural form of life, which had prevailed for untold thousands of years, to a highly industrial civilization, which has its own problems and institutions,
and to meet these the Constitution must, of necessity, be a.dapted if it is to live.
It would be interesting, if time permitted, to discuss these changes by usage, which are for practical
purposes almost as effective as if lwritten into the
Constitution itself. A few illustrations must suffice.
Take, as one example, the nature of the Presidential office. First, as to its duration. The prohibition of a third term is no part of the written Constitution. It is insusceptible of judicial enforcement
and is not a provision in the proper sense of the
word. No one can question the legal eligibility of a
President to have as many terms as the people care
to elect him. None the less, in the English sense of
the word "Constitution," the Third Term tradition
has hitherto been a very potent force in limiting the
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servIce of a President to two terms. One of the
most striking and portentous phenomena of our
time is the altered position of the President in our
constitutional system. The Constitution was built
upon the English conception since 1689 of a great
Council of the Realm, in whom ultimate legislative
power was vested. The President was merely to
execute the policies which Congress, as the peculiar
representative of the will of the people, would require. This, however, did not accord with the subconscious spirit of the American people. Their
religion is efficiency. They believe in concentrating
power and holding as few men responsible as possible. One has only to view our industrial organization to see the reality of this fact.
Due to this genius for efficiency and to the development of the party system, the office of President has long since become more similar to that of
a constitutional monarch than! to that of a mere
executive servant of the ' people. In the practical
working of our government, the President does not
accept from Congress the policies that he is to
execute, but it becomes his political duty to compel
Congress to execute the policies for which he accepts
responsibility to the people. When a Congress is in
sympathy with :a President, he, as the real leader
of his party, prescribes the program, and unless it
be plainly unwise, his party in Congress is required
to carry the President's policies into effect. Such
was not the purpose of the Constitution, but such
has become its practical workings through the in-
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fluence of the people and the usages of politics.
Again, the over-shadowing power of the President
has been developed through his power to remove
officials, a power not expressly conferred by the
Constitution but a necessary incident, as I successfully argued in the Supreme Court, to the executive power.
Thus I could multiply instances of the adaptation
of the theories of the Constitution to the genius of
the American people and to the necessities of practical government. I will, however, cite only one
other and an even more striking illustration. The
theory of the Constitution was to keep the three
departments as independent and as separate from
each other as possible. This was the principle of
Montesquieu. The framers, however, finding this
quite impossible, attempted to respect the principle,
so far as possible, but in the actual w'Orkings of our
government the interdependence of the departments
and the interblending of their functions have proceeded with ever-accelerating speed.
Is there, then, nothing in the Constitution that
remains unaltered? Have we built our government
upon shifting sands?
To this last question an emphatic negative can
be given. ,/The foundation of our government is as
a rock and, like a house built upon a rock, it has
stood and will stand, please God, for centuries to
come, but the superstructure is the result of progressive interpretation and adaptation.
If the
framers would have difficulty in recognizing some
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portions of the superstructure, they would 'find the
foundation much 'as they-the Master Buildersconstructed it.
In distinguishing between the temporary and the
permanent, we must bear in mind the three-fold
aspect of the Constitution. The first I may call its
contractual character. It is a solemn compact between thirteen states, to which great partnership
thirty-five other states-some the creation of yesterday-have now been admitted. While in a
broader institutional sense the Constitution was the
creation of the American people, thereby meaning
the people of the nascent American commonwealth,
yet organically, it is the creation of states, which
surrendered a part of their sovereignty to create a
common governmental agency for certain objectives,
to which the states, individually, could not effectively
contribute. We are still the United States and not
a unified state, and the solemn covenants that were
entered into in the Constitution between the states,
as to the nature of the government which they
created, cannot be broken without a gross breach
of faith.
Take, for example, the equality of the sovereign
states in the Senate. From a democratic point of
view, it is indefensible. The population of Pennsylvania is the equivalent of the aggregate population
of sixteen states, which could readily be named and
yet these sixteen states exercise sixteen times the
power in the Senate that the historic commonwealth
of Pennsylvania does.

Only subordinate to that, if I may be permitted
an excursion into contemporary controversy, is the
undoubted right of each state to select its own representatives in the Senate and not have the representatives of other states select those representatives
for it. It is true that the Senators from a state
must have certain qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution, but, otherwise, the forty-seven states
are theoretically powerless to dictate to one state
who the representatives of the latter shall be. In
the old days of sectional strife, Mississippi might
have grave objection to the s.election by Massachusetts of Charles Sumner as its Senator, and Massachusetts, in its turn, might have equally grave doubts
about the selection of Jefferson Davis by Mississippi,
but the right of each state to select its own Senator
was a basic condition upon which the Federal Government was formed. In my opinion, the Senate
has no right whatever to determine the moral or
intellectual qualifications of a Senator. Otherwise,
a sovereign State would only nominate its representatives in the Senate and the Senators from other
states would have the final right of selection. Such a
doctrine would have made the framers rub their
eyes in amazement. The right to equality in the
Senate and the right of each state to choose its
Senator is not anything that usage Or judicial interpretation can alter-it is a matter of solemn obligation and, as such, is unalterable. The basic conditions, upon which the states were willing to create a
r
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Federal Government, are unchangeable without a
gross breach of faith.
Again, it must be remembered that the Constitution consists of something more than the mechanics
of government. It contains certain fundamental
verities of liberty, which limit the grant of power
and which, because they have their sanction in the
moral conscience of mankind and are based upon
considerations of eternal morality, are unchangeable.
All nations have had a conception: of what they
sometimes called "natural law" and at other times
the "higher law," by which they meant these fundamental verities of human freedom. Cicero spoke of
a Higher Law, "which was never written and which
we are never taught; which we never learn by reading, but which was drawn by Nature herself."
Sophocles makes his Antigone speak of "those unwritten, unfailing mandates, which are not of today
or yesterday, but ever live and no one knows their
birth-tide. "
Some of these fundamental decencies of government are expressly written into the Constitution.
Such, for example, is the declaration that property
shall not be taken by the Government for public
use without just compensation.
But the full interpretation of many does not rest
upon the letter of the Constitution, but upon the
enlightened . conscience of mankind. Take, for example, the declaration that a man shall not be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." What is "due process of law"? The
[ 2I ]

expression is a vague one. It is the English equivale)1t of the old Latin maxim in Magna Charta that
the rights of freemen should not be taken away
except in accordance "with the law of the land."
That law was largely a matter of unwritten customs,
which constituted the political conscience of the English people.
Due process of law simply means that there are
certain fundamental conceptions of public morality
and fair dealing, which are implied without being
expressed. For example, that a man should not be
condemned without a hearing, or that a man should
not sit as judge in his own cause. These moral
limitations upon the powers of government are as
binding as if formally written into the Constitution
and are as immutable as the laws of morality.
Property rights embodied in the great Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," do not derive their
sanction from any words graven in stone, or written
on parchment, but from a fundamental and eternal
conception of morality, and this is so, even if the
Soviet Government has paid little attention to any
such conception of morality.
Between these contractual obligations, which inhere in the compact of the Union, and the fundamental conceptions of morality, which justly limit
the powers of any government, the Constitution contains many mechanical details of government, which
naturally must be adapted from time to time by
usage, practical administration or judicial interpretation to the changed conditions of life in the
[ 22 ]

Twentieth Century. As previously stated, our whole
conception of commerce has been amplified a thousand-fold since the Constitution was adopted, and
many other illustrations could be cited.
I have already trespassed far too long upon your
time, but I cannot conclude without very briefly applying these observations to what was once the greatest question in American politics and what is still
a vital question, although it excites at the moment
very little interest. I refer to what was formerly
called "centralization. " Nothing more strikingly
illustrates the profound changes in our constitutional
ideas, due to the ethos of the people than this question of centralization. When the Constitution was
adopted, the states had a very real consciousness of
their own sovereignty. The consciousness of national
unity was a very slow growth. The reluctance with
which the states granted any measure of power to
the central government and the fact that the Constitution was literally wrung from the states by the
sheer necessity of social conditions, illustrate this
fact. The success of the national government and
the immense moral influence of George Washington
slowly developed the idea of a powerful union.
These causes, however, were insignificant as compared with the changes which were brought about
through the influences of mechanical invention. The
Union is held together today, not so much by the
Constitution, as by the shining pathways of steel,
over which our railroads run, and the innumerable

wires, which, like antennae, co-ordinate the energies
of the American people.
To these must now be added one of the most
potent unifying forces of all, namely, the radio.
While the press served as a consolidating influence
yet the influence of a newspaper was limited to the
zone of its circulation. Today, however, any responsible leader of thought may on occasion speak
to twenty millions of people. Thus, both time and
space have been annihilated, and the people have
been irresistibly drawn into the consciousness of a
central government, which far over-shadows the consciousness of the states. This has caused! a profound
change in the ethos of the people in this respect and
our institutions have become so unified that the old
struggle against centralization has largely passed
away. Each of the old political parties, when in
power, vie with the other in consolidating the Union
by multiplying the bureaucratic agencies by means
of which many matters hitherto within the power of
the states are now controlled from Washington. To
the extent that this is the result of economic forces
it is irresistible, even if not always desirable, but to
the extent that it is the result of the greed for power,
which grows by what it feeds upon, it is a grave
peril. The problem of the future is to hold this
centripetal tendency measurably in check, for it is
as true today as when the Constitution was adopted
that our government will not always continue, if the
planetary system of the states be absorbed in the
central sun of the Federal Government. Our nation
[ 24 ]
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is too vast in area and our people too numerous to
be governed altogether from Washington. The
safety of the Union depends upon the preservation
of the :rights of the states, and the difficulty is to
preserve these rights when the elemental forces of
steel, electricity and now the radio continue to weld
the country into a powerful unity a~d to reduce the
political consciousness of the states almost to that
of subordinate police provinces.
When the centennial of the Constitution was celebrated in 1887, Charles Francis Adams, the lineal
descendant of a federal and a Whig President, made
this statement:
"Steam and electricity have in these days converted each thoughtful Hamiltonian into a believer
of the constitutional theories of Jefferson. Today
everything centralizes itself. Gravitation is the law.
The centripetal forces, unaided by government,
working only through scientific sinews and nerves
of steam and steel and lightning, this centripetal
force is nearly overcoming all centrifugal action.
The ultimate result can by thoughtful men no longer
be ignored. Jefferson is right and Hamilton is
wrong."
I do not agree with Mr. Adams. It seems to me
more accurate to say that neither Jefferson nor
Hamilton was wholly right or wrong. They represented opposite poles of political thought and yet
each was necessary to the development of America.
To Hamilton we owe the development of the Constitution through administrative organization, and to
Jefferson we owe an equal development by demo-
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era tic idealism. Between these extremists, who represented the positive and negative forces of the
electric current, was John Marshall, and' it was he
who found the Constitution "a skeleton and clothed
it with flesh and blood." He held the tremendous
issues of state and national sovereignty in the even
scales of justice and today his great opinions are the
living oracles of the Constitution.
The problem of the future will be to preserve the
just equipoise, which the Constitution vainly sought
to maintain between the power of the central government and the power of the states. Otherwise, the
Federal Government will become of such overshadowing importance that, in the remote future,
there may be a counter-check ofa powerful move
towards disintegration.
Weare still a young country. In my youth I
might well have known a distinguished lawyer of
Philadelphia, then over 90 years of age, who saw
Washington and Franklin conversing in front of
Independence Hall during the sessions of the Constitutional Convention.
This measures the brief
span of our existence.
Centuries are still before
America and who can safely say that, if it becomes
too centrat'ized for efficient government, one day
there may not be a powerful movement towards the
division of the Republic into two or three republics,
especially if there develop between the sections
powerful economic conflicts of policy? The history
of nations in an unending cycle of integration and
disintegration, of consolidating and then redistri-
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buting the powers of governments. Human institutions, like the globules of mercury, tend to scatter
and unite. For more than a century the tendency of
America has been to consolidate, but let us remember that if the movement proceed too far, the tendency to disintegrate will begin.
The best method of preventing so deplorable a
result is to preserve the rights of the states in their
full integrity. The ideal of every patriotic American should be "The indissoluble union of indestructible states."
And this suggests a final thought. The salvation
of our form of government, in the last analysis,
rests with the people, and the most discouraging sign
of the times is their indifference to constitutional
questions. What I have elsewhere called "constitutional morality" was never at a lower ebb.
This is largely due to the over-shadowing importance and grandeur of the Federal Government. Like
the central sun, it blinds our vision and, at least in
popular consciousness, the states a re gradually fading in importance, even as the planets cannot be
Sten by day because of the omnipresent rays of
the sun.
At the beginning of the Republic, there were thirteen self-conscious states, which had behind them a
century or more of traditions. But the union of the
states is now composed of forty-eight states, many
of which are but the creation of yesterday and which
have no such background of tradition to stimulate
the consciousness of the people. Most of them are

the creation of purely artificial boundaries and, while
there is some local pride, yet they naturally regard
themselves as the children of the Federal Government, whereas the historic thirteen colonies had, at
least at one time, the proud consciousness that they
created the Federal Union and that the Federal
Union did not create them. I confess I cannot see
the way to combat this changed consciousness of the
American people, which is so largely due to mechanical forces which no written Constitution could overcome.
The loss of the sense of constitutional morality,
without which it is difficult for any Constitution to
survive, is also due to a subtler cause and one that
is too little appreciated. Our very depenq,ence upon
a written Constitution and our belief in its static
nature and its self-executing powers has tended to
deaden the political consciousness of the American
people. We live in an age of specialization, and
the people, forgetful that, in the last analysis, they
must save themselves, feel that a Constitution will
execute itself and that the special and exclusive
method of determining all constitutional questions is
by resort to the courts.
This is especially perceptible in our legislative
bodies. Time was when Congress felt that it had
the primary duty of determining whether proposed
laws were within its constitutional power. Many of
the greatest debates upon the meaning of the Constitution took place in the halls of Congress and not
in court rooms. The controversy over the power to
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create a United States Bank, and later, the power
to make internal improvements, and later the
validity of the Missouri Compromise, were questions which Congress had no disposition to shift to
the judiciary, but which they preferred in the first
instance to decide for themselves. This is as it
should be, for every member of Congress takes an
oath, as a Judge, to support and maintain the Constitution of the United States.
In recent years there has been no disposition to
argue the constitutional phase of any proposed law
in Congress,. Such a debate would be regarded as a
loss of public time, as the question must ultimately
be determined by the Supreme Court. Laws are frequently passed of very doubtful constitutionality and
their validity left to the processes of litigation. This
might be 3.) satisfactory division of governmental
work if the Supreme Court had unrestricted and
plenary power to disregard a constitutional statute
or executive act, but such is' not the fact. Many laws
are politically anti-constitutional without being juridically unconstitutional. Even in cases where the
judiciary can determine the validity of a law, it yet
holds that all doubts must be resolved in favor of
the legislation, and that only a clear and almost indisputable repugnance to the Constitution will justify
a decision adverse to its validity. In this way, many
laws, which Congress regarded as of doubtful constitutionality when they passed them and which the
court itself regards of doubtful constitutionality, are
yet enforced on the ground that their repugnancy
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to the Constitution is not clear beyond a reasonable
doubt.
.
Through this breach in the dike, a flood of legislation wholly inconsistent with the spirit, and at times
inconsistent with the letter, of the Constit~tion, constantly passes, and, being thus accepted as law, the
Constitution itself is slowly weakened.
In a recent book, I likened this wearing away of
constitutional guarantees to the erosion of a beach
by the ocean. I venture to quote the metaphor that
I then used:
"The encroaching waves each day ebb and flow.
At high tide there is less beach .and at low tide more.
At times the beach will be devoured by the ocean,
when a tempest has lashed it into a fury, and then
the waters will become as placid as a mountain lake,
and the shore will seem to have triumphed in this
age-old struggle between land and water.
"The owner of the upland is often deceived by the
belief that the fluctuations of the battle generally
leave the shore line intact, but when he considers
the results of years, and not of months, he will
realize that the shore has gradually lost in the
struggle and that slowly, but steadily, the ocean is
eating into the land."
Therefore, I plead for an awakened conscience
on the part of our legislators and the people themselves in the matter of constitutional morality.
They should primarily determine these grave issu.es
of constitutionality for themselves. Unless they do
so, they are in grave danger of losing the benefits of
the wisest instrument of statecraft that the wit of
"Eternal vigilance is the price
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